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Paternalism as a field of bioethical 
concern
ABSTRACT
Paternalism becomes an issue in difficult situations when a physician in some way intention-
ally affects and limits the decision-making autonomy of the patient. Even though paternalism 
is literally interpreted as an attitude that appreciates paternal warmth, treating someone who 
is not a child paternalistically means treating him wrongly. It is reasonable for people to regard 
the respect of their rights as a protection against subjugation. If doing wrong to another per-
son is contrary to what I would do to myself, then I must admit that nonreversible behaviour 
is wrong in itself. Whoever engages in nonreversible behaviour is doing wrong, or performing 
an irrational act. Autonomy and rights belong to the key metaethical concepts because vulner-
ability of all rational beings to subjugation is universal and our rational capacity to recognize 
it establishes its primacy over other moral ideals. Vulnerability to subjugation is an intrinsic 
qualification of human existence because every human being can harm the other. My duty 
to be accountable for your vulnerability is implied in my power to harm you. In order not to 
harm each other I must move from the logic of power, to the logic of duty. What makes self-
ish action unethical is not that the agent has been a self centred paternalist only, yet the fact 
that selfish interests have served as criteria for action. This paper aims to infer what sorts of 
virtues are required to direct the physician to meet the interests of the patient as if they were 
his own, just for the sake of moral reason which requires not to harm the other person. The 
patient’s right to accept or refuse medical care changes the position of the physician’s power 
over the patient because moral principles are those of reciprocity. Bioethical quest for a correct 
method all moral agents ought to be guided by refers to the conviction that it is rational to 
come as close as possible to the ideal moral judgment. Since a system of moral rules free of 
conflicts between principles and exceptions to principles does not exist, physicians are con-
stantly confronted by conflicting demands in their need to decide what kind of consideration 
is weightier. Since paternalism is against the informed consent, it insists that patients believe 
in the doctor’s conscience and skill and act as the doctor tells them to do. If the physician acts 
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beneficently to protect the patient from harm and the patient resists, the physician acts from 
the perspective of medicine which violates the autonomy model. Bioethics aims to advance 
human good because it provides a connection between goals of normative ethics and the 
establishment of principles for handling violations of rationally grounded moral decisions.
Key words: paternalism, power, right, beneficence model, autonomy model, moral reason, 
informed consent
Introduction
Questions about the ethical justifiability of the behaviour of the physician who deliber-
ately influences a patient and restricts the patient’s autonomy1 are bioethical concerns 
because new, powerful techniques of intervention are constantly introduced in medi-
cine, which may be contrary to the patient’s right to preserve his/her human dignity in 
every moment. Such context requires the ultimate ethical responsibility of physicians to 
be redefined with a goal to create high-quality services that are sensitive to the growing 
vulnerability of patients. Growing vulnerability should not be understood as a weak-
ness; a high level of vulnerability implies moral significance, since precisely because of it 
"someone else" (i.e. physicians and medical staff) must even further deepen their human-
ity. A person who limits autonomy affects the well-being of a patient because such a 
person approaches the patient from a strictly clinical perspective, making everything 
the medical profession requires. But if a medical procedure interferes with -according to 
the patient’s opinion- unacceptable intervention in order to prevent damage, such ap-
proach is called paternalistic. If the patient is not provided with care appropriate to his/
her autonomy and personal integrity, the procedure should be characterized as morally 
wrong. Bioethics views such questions from a more general, philosophical perspective 
and standardizes principles which should be chosen in concrete cases. 
The complexity of the term Paternalism 
Civil2 state is committed to the aspiration of treating all citizens as legally and mor-
ally equal. According to the mentioned principle, treating someone who is not a 
child paternalistically, means treating him wrongly. Paternalism implies interference 
1 The term "autonomy" (Croatian: "autonomnost") in this text is used rather than the term "independence" 
(Croatian: "autonomija") simply to stress the fact that man is a moral subject, so independence (in the sense of 
freedom, as opposed to self-will) is a primary qualification of his integrity.
2 Civil state is nominally organized so as to be committed to the aspiration of treating all citizens as individuals who are 
legally and morally equal. It is contrary to theocratic, class and caste legal structures. The word "civil" is not synonymous 
with the word "civic" since it does not refer just to the inhabitants to the cities. "Civil" as opposed to "bourgeois" is 
a political term, which historically emerged in the moment when modern nation was formed, which outgrows the 
traditional notion of "people". It is related to the specific structure and role of institutions in liberal democracies.
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in the freedom of another person’s action without having a permission to do so. 
Therefore, any paternalistic behaviour demands moral justification. Physicians are 
not supposed to make decisions in their own interest, but in the interest of other 
persons, defined by the respect of their autonomy. Utilitarians generally claim that 
any paternalistic behaviour is justified because it allegedly creates more benefits than 
harms. It is based on a desire of an authority to regulate views and feelings of subor-
dinate society members, i.e. an aspiration to change someone else’s personality into 
a means and in that way to prevent this person to act autonomously. Unlike utilitar-
ians, deontologists do not approve of concrete actions simply because of their bene-
ficial implications, they approve of a certain action only in the name of what is 
right. They consider some acts wrong regardless of the good consequences that re-
sult from them. However, experts warn that deontology and utilitarianism generally 
do not appear in an entirely pure form; therefore, clear orientation of activity direc-
tion (that would qualify a given act either as deontological or utilitarian) may not be 
visible at a first glance.3 The problem of paternalism occurs when the understanding 
of the notion of wellbeing gains a double meaning, i.e. under the circumstances 
where the understanding of the patient’s best interests from the medical perspective 
begins to differ from the understanding of the same interests from the patient’s per-
spective. Beauchamp states that the first model is called the beneficence model of 
moral responsibility in medicine.4 The second model defines the best interests 
from the patient’s perspective as understood by the patient, and is called the auton-
omy model of moral responsibility in medicine. Moore states that the most fun-
damental question of ethics in general is the question of how to define good itself. 
Such research belongs solely to ethics, so if it is not recognized, the rest of ethics 
from the perspective of systematic knowledge will remain useless.5 What is right and 
what is wrong are associated with ethics on the basis of the derivation and by no 
means on the basis of custom. With a question how to understand a physician’s re-
sponsibility toward the patient whose autonomy is reduced, it is obvious that cus-
tom does not provide a satisfactory answer. As claimed by Macario Alemany, pater-
nalism always implies the need to justify the activity of the stronger side. In his 
opinion, what is meant by paternalism refers to a collection of criminal norms 
aimed to protect individuals from themselves.6 In that respect, it is very important 
3 Frank Harron, John Burnside & Tom Beauchamp: Health and Human Values, Yale University Press, New 
Haven and London, 1983, p.6
4 Tom L. Beauchamp & Laurence B. McCullough: Medical Ethics – The Moral Responsibilities of Physicians, 
Prentice-Hall., Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1984, p.22
5 George Edward Moore, Principia Ethica (From: Andrew G. Oldenquist: Moral Philosophy – Text and Readings, 
Second Edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1987), pp.280-281
6 Macario Alemany: Paternalism and Bioethics www.giuri.unige.it/phd/paper/alemany.pdf, p.1
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to distinguish the violation of moral rules from failure to follow moral ideal. Moral 
does not only consist of rules but of ideals as well. Ethically, failure is far more nega-
tive than the care not to violate moral rules is positive. Moral rules7 refer to the 
(negative) acts that we must not do, while moral ideals point to positive acts that 
should be done so that we may avoid mistakes or damage. Violating of moral rules 
always requires an adequate justification: if there exists no moral reason to do some-
thing, then doing what should not be done is called paternalistic and should be 
perceived as morally unacceptable. However, according to authors Culveru & Gert, 
failing to follow a moral ideal does not require moral justification, therefore, such 
failure – although it is incorrect – we do not call paternalistic.8 
The context of paternalism
Ethical issues related to the notion of right, i.e. informed consent enter into the 
centre of bioethical attention when we are not sure where to direct further action, 
or, as stated by Capron, failure to protect the weak condemns the entire society.9 
While considering how to determine the conditions of informed consent, it is im-
portant to clarify who should be responsible for vague orders, and who should be 
held responsible for orders that are clear, but are not followed. As stated by Alistair 
McAlpine, incomprehensible commands are the fault of the commander, while or-
ders that are clear and still disobeyed are the fault of those commanded.10 In the 
past, in medical profession lacked respect for the informed consent within the deci-
sion-making procedures. This was considered normal in the same way as it was con-
sidered normal not to give antibiotics for severe inflammation (since antibiotics 
were not in use yet). But, today’s paternalistic practice is archaic; it is not only mor-
ally wrong, but also illegitimate, especially when carried out because of nostalgia for 
the past times. Paternalism always implies two goals:
1. Prevent doing wrong to other person.
2. Usurp the other person’s decision-making rights.
Therefore, paternalism implies interference with other persons against their will, 
usurping their right to decide for themselves and thus fulfill their human need to 
7 Bernard Gert: The Moral Rules, Harper & Row, New York, 1970, p.63
8 Charles M. Culver, Bernard Gert: Philosophy in Medicine – Conceptual and Ethical Issues in Medicine and 
Psychiatry, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, p.132
9 Ethics in Biomedical Research – International Perspectives, Edited by Matti Häyry, Tuija Takala, and Peter 
Herissone-Kelly, With a Foreword by Alexander Morgan Capron, Rodopi, Amsterdam, New York, 2007, p.XI
10 Alistair McAlpine Alistair (Publisher): The Ruthless Leader – Three Classics of Strategy and Power, John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., New York, 2000, p.1
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qualify as human beings, i.e. to be moral subjects. Although paternalistic behaviour 
is justified by an aspiration to protect another person, acting paternalistically still 
means treating the other person ethically wrong. Beauchamp rightfully points out 
that philosophers make efforts to show they do not want to confuse personal intui-
tive attitudes (i.e. non-reflective and non-objective principles) with a reasonable and 
justified moral position.11 Namely, doing what is morally wrong is morally unaccep-
table. No one is allowed to do a morally wrong act just because they want to. To vi-
olate a moral rule is justified only if there exists a morally adequate reason for that, 
which is allowed only under the pressure of a better understanding of ethical ideals. 
The role of society in paternalistic issues
As previously established, the idea of well-being, as it is understood from the medi-
cal perspective sometimes differs from the patient’s autonomous perspective. Ac-
cording to the views of a number of authors, the perception of bioethics does not 
only consist of generally accepted and verified knowledge, but is manifested more as 
a field of acute debates and disagreements.12 Under such circumstances, physicians 
are typically conditioned to see the world from the perspective of instrumental 
knowledge and access problems from a strictly clinically-oriented perspective. The 
medical decision-making procedure functions as a system of externally imposed 
prohibitions on a course of action. Since in moral philosophy the idea of personal 
autonomy belongs to the field of self-control,13 a medically-oriented approach easily 
comes into conflict with the needs, values and beliefs of patients. Conflicting groups 
tend to manifest collective behaviour in striving to reach the right answers. Feldman 
states that group members have such a strong motivation to reach consensus, so that 
they lose the ability to critically evaluate alternative positions. Physicians should be 
considered responsible for the principles that guide them because they do not work 
in a vacuum; their services are always required in a concrete social environment.14 
The power to make and carry out decisions should be derived from the principles 
that are good because they are correct, and certainly not just because they have posi-
11 Tom L.Beauchamp & Laurence B. McCullough: Medical Ethics – The Moral Responsibilities of Physicians, 
Prentice-Hall., Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1984, p.11
12 Ethics in Biomedical Research – International Perspectives, Edited by Matti Hayry, Tuija Takala, and Peter 
Herissone-Kelly, With a Foreword by Alexander Morgan Capron, Rodopi, Amsterdam, New York, 2007, p.125
13 Moral autonomy does not mean erratic behaviour nor self-will, and the least of all slavery to any instinctive or 
non-instinctive passions and preferences. The ability to self-control implies actions of a person with built character 
integrity, balanced with the help of all virtues together. I am not elaborating on the meaning of the term virtue 
here. European civilization roots are abundant with such heritage, particularly elaborated in the world famous 
Aristotle’s writing: Nicomachean Ethics.
14 Robert S. Feldman: Essentials of Understanding Psychology, Fourth Edition, McGrawHill, Boston, 2000, p.526
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tive results understood only from the medical perspective. If a treatment is not at-
tentive to the patient’ needs, patient’s will should be a decision-making authority. 
The same opinions are held by the authors who believe that knowledge is not an 
absolute value and that progress does not necessarily lead to good.15 Science should 
not become self-creating. Instead, the interests of science must be subordinated to 
the society. Every human being has the intrinsic, unconditional value and, in order 
to respect human right to dignity, it is not acceptable to reduce people from subjects 
to objects. Therefore, Alasdair Macintyre reasonably argues that the issues of medi-
cal ethics are precisely the problems of the patients, and not of the physicians.16 
Patients are persons with acute needs. If services available to them rest on intrinsic 
values and on moral reason, they will be consistent with their authentic interests. 
Patients are persons who use a service at its most concrete level, thus their rights 
should be protected, especially under the circumstances of a controversial medical 
choice. If a clinical situation of the patient is properly defined, but the patient does 
not want to be a passive observer in the application of a new medical routine, he/she 
must be better informed about available options so that the choice would actually 
be left to the patient. Unfortunately, the application of rights of such type of re-
sponsibilities, duties and obligations varies from culture to culture. Each culture 
generates its own specific pattern by which its members think about the conflict of 
interest and how to react in controversial situations. People tend to subject them-
selves to paternalism and acquire authoritarian personality not only because they are 
raised in a paternalistic environment. Cruel childhood upbringing experiences and 
suppressed hostility toward authorities in the past do not affect the youth in the 
sense that they will automatically become oppressors in the future. Those who have 
suffered from repression in the past are not necessarily predetermined to oppress 
those who cannot immediately revenge themselves. Many other motives play an im-
portant role in understanding cultural influences that are pro or contra the paternal-
istic behaviour pattern. Bob Altemeyer, for example, believes that the sources of au-
thoritarianism are much more related to the stereotypes and prejudices of a social 
environment in which adolescents can see that it is acceptable to express hostility 
towards the weak.17
15 Ethics in Biomedical Research – International Perspectives, Edited by Matti Häyry, Tuija Takala, and Peter 
Herissone-Kelly, With a Foreword by Alexander Morgan Capron, Rodopi, Amsterdam, New York, 2007, pp.181-
182
16 Philosophical Medical Ethics: Its Nature and Significance, Edited by Stuart F. Spicker and H. Tristram Engelhardt, 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, Boston, 1977, p.197
17 Stephen L. Franzoi: Social Psychology, Second Edition, McGrawHill, Boston, 2000, p.241
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The progress of the western world is equated with various dimensions of modern 
support to individual so that the normative position of a citizen18 is consistent with 
free and equal individuality. It is believed that personal autonomy is the same as the 
duty to maximize the individual’s right to make decisions on his own.19 This implies 
that a reasonable opinion of another person should be accepted.
The roots of anti-paternalism
Ethical issues related to paternalistic behaviour are becoming increasingly important 
because paternalism undermines the idea of the legal and moral equality of people. 
Restrictive ideologies of totalitarian systems use status differences between people as 
a basis on which the individual is "granted" more or less rights. The human rights in 
such systems are viewed upon as the rights that belong only to officials or privileged 
individuals. The idea of the rights of all people as autonomous subjects is neglected. 
Paternalism appears in medical ethics on the same platform: it manifests as a treat-
ment mediation by the physician who is status-wise, professionally and medically 
superior to the patient and therefore thinks that he/she can act against the patient’s 
will with the justification that patient will be better protected from worsening. 
However, the terms rationality and irrationality are not mere designations of right 
or wrong actions. Culver indicates that rationality is not primarily a designation of 
actions but rather convictions. Therefore, PERSONS as subjects can act rationally, 
while ACTIONS can be irrational.20 Since irrationality is a more fundamental term, 
discussing a right, i.e. informed consent, is of a very high importance, especially in 
medicine: patients are more vulnerable than clients in other professions.21 It is typi-
cal that patients know much less about alternative treatments, while their medical 
condition may also distort their view of reality. All this tells us that the consequenc-
es of either proper or improper treatment are very serious. Paternalistic practice does 
not occur only in medicine; it is present in other professions as well. In all profes-
sions, the problem of unrecognised informed consent brings into question the idea 
of legal and moral equality of people. Regardless of all professions being equally af-
fected by such improper practice, the difference between medicine and other profes-
sions varies only in its degree, and not type. If decisions are reached unilaterally, the 
patients will suffer more brutally than the clients in any other profession. Culver 
18 It is meant civil identity.
19 Normative Ethical Principles and Theories, http://www.stedwards.edu/ursey/norm.htm, pp.2-5
20 Charles M. Culver, Bernard Gert: Philosophy in Medicine – Conceptual and Ethical Issues in Medicine and 
Psychiatry, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, pp.22-25
21 Charles M. Culver, Bernard Gert: Philosophy in Medicine – Conceptual and Ethical Issues in Medicine and 
Psychiatry, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, p.26
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mentions that medicine usually lacks another very relevant determinant of informa-
tion: the mortality and morbidity rate of a unilaterally imposed treatment proce-
dure in any individual healthcare centre: the physician sometimes is not aware of 
the epidemiological data, i.e. the fact that the need for a recommended surgery in 
one healthcare centre is suggested far often than in other healthcare centres. There-
fore, there is a possibility that the suggested surgery is completely unnecessary.22 It is 
obvious that both models (beneficence and autonomy models) constitute together 
what we call the moral responsibility of physicians toward patients. But, Beauchamp 
& McCullough warn that a problem arises if we do not clearly define how physi-
cians’ responsibility should be understood under the circumstances of reduced pa-
tient’s autonomy caused by ignorance, fear, or depression, external or internal com-
pulsion.23 Their answer refers to the attitude that an orientation which, in a situation 
of opposing principles of moral responsibility, selects only one approach is unaccep-
table. 24 Namely, humanity, even within the medical framework, is reflected in 
openness toward a truly ethical purpose, incarnated in actions in compliance with 
the notion of reciprocity. 
How to turn the cultural roots of paternalism towards ethical 
principles?
In the past conflicts of interests were resolved by violence. Regardless of whether the 
violence was in the form of physical strength, hidden compulsion, status, role or 
professional expertise, the result was always the same: one of the parties was not 
protected from becoming a loser. Modern liberal societies of developed democracies 
base the moral identity of citizens on the idea of positive human rights (the rights of 
the weaker side to every benefit) from which no individual may be excluded. Such 
rights are considered as a limiting factor that serves to protect from violence.25 Both 
in deontological and utilitarian theories, principles and rules were traditionally con-
sidered as the principles and rules of obligation. Such views probably derived from 
history since in the 17th and 18th centuries ethics was rarely discussed in terms of 
rights. Political and ethical theories were focused on the issues of duty toward the 
22 Charles M. Culver, Bernard Gert: Philosophy in Medicine – Conceptual and Ethical Issues in Medicine and 
Psychiatry, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, p.45
23 Tom L. Beauchamp & Laurence B. McCullough: Medical Ethics – The Moral Responsibilities of Physicians, 
Prentice-Hall., Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1984, pp.104-112 
24 Tom L. Beauchamp & Laurence B. McCullough: Medical Ethics – The Moral Responsibilities of Physicians, 
Prentice-Hall., Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1984, p.164
25 Kenneth Cloke & Joan Goldsmith: Resolving Conflicts at Work, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 2000, 
p.142
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master, king, state, church, and God. The transformation of the processes of vio-
lence into processes of respecting rights resulted from changes in economic, social, 
religious, cultural, and political activities that occurred in the history of the liberal, 
democratic, civil, cultural system of the "West". One of such changes is the matura-
tion of the idea that universal human rights must be universal because we possess 
them regardless of merits, we have them simply because we are humans. 26 These re-
fer to fair treatment in the matters of justice, freedom, and equality of access to fa-
vourable possibilities. Violation of such rights diminishes our human dignity, as 
well as experience of self-respect. In a developmental sense, legally and morally 
equal individuals were initially unequal. As members of different groups in small 
communities, their status was still determined and ranked according to the roles 
they occupied in the local hierarchical scale of authority. Opposite to such hierar-
chical models of power, the term of legal and moral equality is determined by an ef-
fort to comprise human civil identity.27 In the social structure of a civil culture, a 
citizen (as a morally equal individual) is a cultural holder of principles by which the 
authority of power and government is designed. This level of moral significance of 
the term citizen becomes analogous to the principles which will be used in a deci-
sion-making process and in medical ethics. Universal ideals lead us further to the 
attitude that rights in the field of nomination are constitutive: human rights belong 
to humans and only humans. If the same right is considered, it is logical that every-
one (including patients) must possess it to the same degree.28 Rights serve to define, 
ensure, and protect human well-being from unjustified intervention and objection. 
If all humans have the same right to well-being, it would be irrational to divide on 
the basis of the right to realisation of well-being. The principle according to which 
no one must be treated differently from someone else (unless there is some general 
and relevant reason for that) is a fundamental principle of morality. Humans have 
an absolute right to expect everyone to accept such a principle. An individual is a 
moral subject and that by definition qualifies such individual to have moral rights. 
Legal rights in modern sense are ethical derivations of moral rights because ethically 
questionable rights in totalitarian ideologies may adopt a form which is considered 
legal within the system. In the text Teaching Medical Ethics – A Philosophical Ap-
proach, Edward Hobbs explores the factors that within the frame of medical educa-
tion contribute to paternalistic behaviour of physicians. He concludes the follow-
26 Ethical Theory and Business, Publishers: Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie, Prentice Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1988, p.46
27 In order that the moral ideas of small communities acquire civil identity, they must externalize in universal way 
by starting to consider individual, diverse identities as accidental. 
28 Richard Wasserstrom: Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination (From: Moral Problems – A Collection 
of Philosophical Essays, Edited by James Rachels, Third Edition, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1979), 
pp.10-12
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ing: for the purpose of medical training, a man is not treated as a subject, he is not 
viewed intersubjectively; a man is considered an object, he is viewed objectively. A 
specific type of objects varies between the model of a machine and that of an ani-
mal, and the role of a physician is implicitly considered to be that of a mechanic or 
veterinarian.29 Undoubtedly, such models can be useful for some purposes. Howev-
er, the philosophical approach to the problem requires commitment to freedom be-
cause freedom is constitutive for ethics. Hobbs exclusively asserts that right and 
wrong have no meaning outside of the parameter of freedom on the side of the sub-
ject, which means that ethics depends on choice and choice depends on freedom, 
even though freedom is limited, or finite.30   
Reason – versus moral reason
Culver & Gert state that no one is ever allowed to kill another, cause any spiritual or 
physical pain, mutilate, deprive of freedom, deprive of a favourable opportunity or 
disrupt pleasure.31 But sometimes we seek for reasons to justify those unallowed 
acts. Since acts do not receive their justification by pure reason, reason remains a 
morally "inactive" principle. Virtue is not a result of abstract reason; acts are in ac-
cordance with virtue only if arising out of moral reason. Moral reasons are not 
something we find in the world, we bring them into the world by constructing 
knowledge. As Hare states, value-words (good, right, fair…) have both extra-moral 
and moral use.32 Kant also warned about this distinction by explicitly saying that 
one should distinguish between good as useful, and to WHAT it is useful. If we call 
good only that which is useful, than there would be nothing which is directly 
good.33  Instrumentally right is not equivalent to morally right. Moral reasons repre-
sent deductive ethical insights and it is possible to derive them both from virtues 
and from principles. According to Hare’s opinion, the rules of deriving moral rea-
sons from virtues and principles must be proscriptivity and universality because ar-
29 Edward C. Hobbs: Teaching Medical Ethics; A Philosophical Approach (From: Robert M. Veatch, Willard 
Gaylin, Councilman Morgan (Publishers): The Teaching of Medical Ethics, A Hastings Center Publication, New 
York, 1973), p.88
30 Edward C. Hobbs: Teaching Medical Ethics; A Philosophical Approach (From: Robert M. Veatch, Willard 
Gaylin, Councilman Morgan (Publishers): The Teaching of Medical Ethics, A Hastings Center Publication, New 
York, 1973), p.89
31 Charles M. Culver, Bernard Gert: Philosophy in Medicine – Conceptual and Ethical Issues in Medicine and 
Psychiatry, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, p.131
32 Richard Hare: The Language of Morals, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, p.160
33 Immanuel Kant: Kant, Immanuel: Critique of Practical Reason, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1974, p.97
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guments do not start out of nothing. 34 If we disregard the two mentioned rules, we 
will also have to ignore an important part of the logical mechanism on which argu-
ments are generally based. Korsgaard says that the reason why an action may lack 
moral value becomes a situation where persons, in the selection of their goals, allow 
themselves to be guided by their own, subjective desire.35 On the other hand, if the 
person, who helps, sees helping as something that is expected from him/her, moral rea-
son will be established. 
Bambrough identified a procedure of differentiation between moral reason and rea-
son outside of the moral sphere. This differentiation shows that every person should 
take into account other person’s interests and prescribe similar activity to others be-
cause doing wrong to another is contrary to reason that I do it to myself. 36  There-
fore, whoever engages in nonreversible behaviour, he/she is doing wrong, or per-
forming an irrational act. Baier states it is irrelevant whether the subject is aware of 
his/her irrational action, or whether his/her society will approve of it. Any nonre-
versible behaviour is morally wrong, not because someone threatens the doer, but 
because such definition has been discovered using reason.37 Richard Hare adds that 
the human status of a moral subject is inevitable because everyone believes to have 
the right to act (action is the essence of human). No one acts in accordance with the 
moral principles at all times, but moral principles are intended to apply to everyone 
and no one is allowed to make exceptions.38 According to Martin, even Socrates 
would have opposed to Sartre’s understanding that only God can achieve a perfectly 
objective moral judgment. Namely, God is not expected to make judgments: God 
could only acknowledge and approve of such moral thinking that justifies "divine 
orders".39 Therefore, only reflected morality helps us to transform selfish thinking 
into moral reasoning. Paternalism exclusively refers to the idea of well-being and has 
a very good reason not to consider the emphatic side of principle of respecting au-
tonomy. However, if a physician completely abandons the beneficence model of 
moral responsibility in medicine, and completely adopts the autonomy model of 
34 Richard Mervyn Hare, Freedom and Reason,(From: Andrew G. Oldenquist: Moral Philosophy – Text and 
Readings, Second Edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1978), p. 34
35 Introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard (Immanuel Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Edited by 
Mary Gregor, Introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), p.XIV
36 Renford Bambrough: The Roots of Moral Reason (From: Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism – Critical Essays with a Reply 
by Alan Gewirth, Edited by Edward Regis Jr., The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1984), p.48 
37 Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (From: George Sher: Moral Philosophy – Selected Readings, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Publishers, San Diego, 1987), p.341
38 Richard Mervyn Hare, Freedom and Reason ( From: Andrew G. Oldenquist: Moral Philosophy – Text and 
Readings, Second Edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1978), p.343
39 Mike W. Martin: Everyday Morality – An Introduction to Applied Ethics, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
Belmont, California, 1988, p.12
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moral responsibility in medicine, this will not be the condition for the ethical justi-
fication of the physician’s activity. Ethics demands values to be translated into ac-
tions; the physician’s knowledge and skills are of little value until he/she transforms 
them into actions. This means that a physician cannot abandon the beneficence 
model of moral responsibility in medicine because the virtue of the physician’s good 
will cannot rest on incomplete values. It is expected from a physician to make deci-
sions, pursuant to his/her best professional cognitions. But, apart from the purpose 
of the physician’s activity to provide help, his/her actions must also at the same time 
be determined by moral reason, i.e. by the necessity not to harm the other person.
Deontological viewpoint on the idea of benefit
The autonomy model of moral responsibility in medicine should be particularly 
protected because patients and physicians are unequal in terms of the power of 
monitoring the referring conditions. The rights of the patients are a corrective to 
this imbalance because imbalance typically occurs in favour of the physicians. De-
ontologists are oriented towards the future, i.e. towards a priori value judgement 
which would be accepted or approved of by any rational and reasonable person. Ac-
cordingly, an autonomous, informed patient has the right to decide whether he/she 
will accept a particular medical intervention or not. Beauchamp40 claims, that legal 
rights are a way of restriction of the physician’s power since they protect the patients 
from unauthorized interventions. No one is empowered to unilaterally violate the 
autonomy of another person. If a single model is accepted to be the only one, the 
power will be easily abused and it will not be possible to develop a method for re-
solving difficult cases. Violence should be evaluated in accordance with the attitude 
that compulsion, if separated from justice and humanity, is unacceptable. The soci-
ety is obliged to intervene if harm has been done to someone and it must show that 
there was a better alternative as well as demonstrate the power to support those who 
are being imposed on an unfavourable choice.41 Beauchamp very strongly approves 
of the same idea, and confirms that the only proper principle of intervention in the 
individual’s autonomy is the need to protect the third party.42 Beauchamp accepts 
this historical argument of anti-paternalism by claiming that interference which 
protects autonomous individuals from themselves should be called paternalistic. 
The universality of moral codes is not absolutely out of the context: an absolute vir-
40 Tom L. Beauchamp & Laurence B. McCullough: Medical Ethics – The Moral Responsibilities of Physicians, 
Prentice-Hall., Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1984, p.43
41 Ethical Issues relating to Life and Death, Edited by John Ladd, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, p.204 
42 Tom L. Beauchamp & Laurence B. McCullough: Medical Ethics – The Moral Responsibilities of Physicians, 
Prentice-Hall., Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1984, p.86
Maja Žitinski: Paternalism as a field of bioethical concern
177
tue may include legitimate exceptions at the moment when duty to protect some 
other rational value becomes more important than the former. Every reasonable per-
son strives to make an autonomous decision on his/her destiny. To general question: 
"Who should decide?", there is no single answer, because complicated cases imply 
risks even when the undertaken procedure is extremely professional, considerate, 
and skilled. "May a patient be allowed to make an autonomous decision even when his/
her choice implies death?" In this case, the duty to protect life directly confronts with 
the duty to protect the autonomy of another person. "Is it justified to prefer the duty 
to protect life over the duty to respect the patient’s choice when it comes to terminal ill-
nesses?"  "Is a demand for the respect of autonomy, weightier?" In ethics it is not accept-
able to unreasonably impose a system of moral rules which would be absolutely iso-
lated from the context of judgment in especially complicated cases we have never 
met before. Such a situation indicates that in ethics it is most important to make 
accurate judgement in order to cater for better understanding of ethical ideals de-
rived from ethics of character.43 The respect for autonomy of a moral subject repre-
sents one of these ideals not only because it is good by itself but also it serves as a 
shield from other people’s choice. Therefore, in a situation of conflict between the 
two models of moral responsibility in medicine – it is rational to prefer autonomy 
model over the beneficence model. Due to the fact that no ethicist has been able to 
establish a model of moral rules which would be free of conflicts between principles 
and exceptions to principles, it is obvious that only a reasonable, complete analysis 
of an individual case may direct us towards an ethical criterion of activity direction. 
Namely, ethicality is not reactive, it does not exhaust by rationalizing the existing 
procedures; ethicality is, by definition, proactive, it implies aspiration for moral 
growth, i.e. advancement of the existing routine, especially when positive human 
rights should be protected.  
Conclusion
Paternalistic issues in the field of medicine arise from the conflict between two in-
terpretations of the term benefit: model from the perspective of the clinical ap-
proach and the model from the autonomous perspective of the patients. Since pa-
tients are prone to suffering, humiliation and subjugation, the ideal of their 
autonomy should be established as primacy over all other moral ideals just because 
no one can be justified for imposing his/her attitudes (even if these attitudes are 
right) on other people. The procedure of imposition abolishes the essential qualifi-
43 Virtues do not exist regardless of intentional and independent activities of live subjects that rather choose the 
right thing because they know it is good.
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cation of a person, contained in everybody’s need to be a moral subject. Being a 
moral subject is an essential determination, superior to all other human attributes. 
Paternalism is a key topic which can examine the validity of various moral theories 
and make judgements how the principles of the rights of moral subjects are respect-
ed. Problems resulting from paternalistic behaviour are best seen in complicated 
cases when patients are not given an appropriate care simply because their well-be-
ing is understood only from the medical perspective. Paternalistic procedures should 
be equalized with instrumental good and by no means with the moral good. Since 
physicians’ virtues cannot be based on incomplete (instrumental) values, the pur-
pose of physicians’ action is to provide help and not to do harm. Utilitarians some-
times have no consideration for protecting patients from unnecessary injuries. In 
contrast to this, deontologists justify principles only if they are compatible with the 
moral reason. Respect for legal and moral rights is one of the reasons because it lim-
its the physician’s superiority. The only justified interference in the free choice of 
other person is the need to protect a third party. We will not acquire virtue by avoid-
ing complex situations but by the effort to define what should be done in a specific 
case. Virtues of character reveal that wrong actions are unacceptable not because of 
fear but for the sake of justice and respect of moral subjectivity, i.e. moral and legal 
equality of another person. If all people are moral subjects, then it is for all an essen-
tial determination. Therefore, it is incorrect to deny another person’s essential deter-
mination to have the right to free choice. 
Prevela s hrvatskog Tajana Tomak, prof.
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